

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3109 2960853
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220853Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0461
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003109

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KCFE](#) [NATO](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON CFE POST-GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 3059

Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
)

¶1. (C) Summary. The MFA continues to press for the resumption of meetings between Russia and the U.S. on the way ahead on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). While acknowledging that the conflict in Georgia has changed the dynamic for such discussions, the MFA has nothing new to offer, merely proposing that the question of Georgia and Russian troop presence at the Gudauta base in Abkhazia be put aside "temporarily," to allow the sides to focus on the other outstanding issues. End summary.

¶2. (C) We met with Counselor Sergey Federyakov of the MFA's Department of Security and Disarmament (DVBR) October 21 to elicit GOR views on the way ahead on CFE, following FM Lavrov's complaint to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Berman (reftel). Federyakov said Russia's goals for bringing the Adapted CFE Treaty into force had not changed following the conflict in Georgia, but he acknowledged that it would be more difficult to resolve the outstanding issues. Since Russia no longer considered Abkhazia part of Georgia, any obligation for Russia to withdraw its troops from the Gudauta base no longer applied. Also, the proposal to document a transfer of Gudauta to Georgia in exchange for a document from the GOG authorizing the presence of Russian troops at the base was no longer possible. He added that Russia was still willing to consider an alternative proposal to provide greater transparency on the troops and equipment at Gudauta, but would now need to discuss such a proposal with the Abkhaz leadership.

¶3. (C) Federyakov said he could not confirm that Russia was likely to use Gudauta as a headquarters for its troops in Abkhazia, but noted that press reports had so indicated. He claimed that however many troops Russia deployed to the two zones (he estimated approximately 3500 for each zone) would be within the flank limits, but quickly reiterated that Russia opposed having flank limits anymore. In response to our skepticism on how we could resolve the issue given Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he suggested using the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh as an example.

¶4. (C) Federyakov reiterated that DVBR Director Antonov was willing to meet with A/S Fried "at anyplace, at anytime," but admitted, that at present, Russia had nothing new to propose on how to resolve either the problem related to Georgia or the other outstanding issues. "If we set a meeting, then we might have some new ideas," he commented. He suggested putting aside the Georgia/Gudauta issue for now to focus on the other issues. He also repeated Russian suggestions to

bring European allies into the talks.
BEYRLE